Paragraph by Paragraph Explanation of Aristotle's "Categories" Ch. 7 - On Relatives
Introducing Relatives
6436. We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, what is larger is called what it is than something else (it is called larger than something) ; and what is double is called what it is of something else (it is called double of something); similarly with all other such cases. The following, too, and their like, are among relatives: state, condition, perception, knowledge, position. For each of these is called what it is (and not something different) of something else. A state is called a state of something, knowledge, knowledge of something, position, position of something, and the rest similarly. All things then are relative which are called just what they are, of or than something else—or in some other way in relation to something else. Thus a mountain is called large in relation to something else (the mountain is called large in relation to something); and what is similar is called similar for something; and the others of this kind are in the same way spoken of in relation to something.
Relatives represent as aspect of a thing's being that manifest only in relation to another thing. Hence Aristotle expresses this as them being "just what they are" (i.e. their identity) OF or THAN other things. For example, the tree is LARGER THAN the car. Or, the salary at this job is HALF OF the salary at that job.
Aristotle elaborates that "state, condition, perception, knowledge, and position" all express a relative relation between things. All of them can be expressed with the phrase OF SOMETHING.
And so the definition given for a relative can be: "All things then are relative which are called just what they are of or than something else --- or in some way in relation to something else."
6>r1. Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative. To-be- -lying, to-be-standing, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names paronymously from the aforesaid positions.
6615. There is contrariety in relatives, e.g. virtue is contrary to vice (and each of them is relative), and knowledge to ignorance. But there is not a contrary to every relative; there is no contrary to what is double or treble or anything like that.
6519. Relatives seem also to admit of a more and a less. For a thing is called more similar and less similar, and more unequal and less unequal; and each of these is relative, since what is similar is called similar to something and what is unequal unequal to something. But not all admit of a more and less; for what is double, or anything like that, is not called more double or less double.
Relatives, unlike quantities which Aristotle discussed in the previous chapter, can have contraries to themselves and therefore admit of a more or less relation to a thing. For example, knowledge has its contrary in ignorance. When ignorance is lessened knowledge increases and when knowledge decreases ignorance increases. Thus, a thing can be more or less in relation to one or the other.
Reciprocating Correlatives
628. All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double; the larger larger than a smaller, and the smaller smaller than a larger; and so for the rest too. Sometimes, however, there will be a verbal difference, of ending. Thus knowledge is called knowledge of what is knowable, and what is knowable knowable by knowledge; perception perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible perceptible by perception.
If relatives exist because a connection between two things manifests some new aspect of a thing's being, then in properly identifying them we must identify the relation correctly proceeding from both relatives to one another. For example, one cannot have slave without its correlative which reciprocates, i.e. master. Likewise, one cannot have master without its reciprocate, slave.
Mistakes in Finding Reciprocating Correlatives
636. Sometimes, indeed, they will not seem to reciprocate—if a mistake is made and that in relation to which something is spoken of is not given properly. For example, if a wing is given as of a bird, bird of a wing does not reciprocate; for it has not been given properly in the first place as wing of a bird. For it is not as being a bird that a wing is said to be of it, but as being a winged, since many things that are not birds have wings. Thus if it is given properly there is reciprocation; for example, a wing is wing of a winged and a winged is winged with a wing.
This example of relating a wing to a bird does not work because it is not reciprocal. You can have a wing of a bird but not a bird of a wing. Hence, they are not correlatives. One could say you have a wing of a winged thing and a winged thing is a thing that has wings.
Inventing Correct Names for Reciprocating Correlatives
745. It may sometimes be necessary even to invent names, if no name exists in relation to which a thing would be given properly. For example, if a rudder is given as of a boat, that is not to give it properly (for it is not as being a boat that a rudder is said to be of it, since there are boats which have not got rudders); and so there is not reciprocation—a boat is not called boat of a rudder. But perhaps it would be given more properly if given thus, that a rudder is rudder of (or somehow else related to) a ‘ruddered’ (since there is no established name) ; and now there is reciprocation, if it is given properly—a ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. Similarly in other cases. For example, a head would be more properly given as of a headed than as of an animal, because it is not as being an animal that a thing has a head, since many animals have not got a head. This is perhaps the easiest way to lay hold of things for which there are no established names—if names derived from the original relatives are assigned to their reciprocating correlatives, as in the above case ‘winged’ was derived from ‘wing’ and ‘ruddered’ from ‘rudder’.
This may sound funny because we do not usually speak like that in everyday life, but properly speaking this is the correct relation and one can invent a word to express it based on the first word. Hence wing to winged thing, rudder to ruddered thing, head to headed thing.
Essential Relation Not Accidental
7222. All relatives, then, are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, provided they are properly given. For, of course, if a relative is given as related to some chance thing and not to just that thing in relation to which it is spoken of, there is not reciprocation. I mean that even with relatives that are admittedly spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate and for which names exist, none reciprocates if a relative is given as related to something accidental and not to just that thing in relation to which it is spoken of. For example, if a slave is given as of—-not a master, but—a man or a biped or anything else like that, there is not reciprocation; for it has not been given properly.
7431. Again, if that in relation to which a thing is spoken of is properly given, then, when all the other things that are accidental are stripped off and that alone is left to which it was properly given as related, it will always be spoken of in relation to that. For example, if a slave is spoken of in relation to a master, then, when everything accidental to a master is stripped off—-like being a biped, capable of knowledge, a man-~and there is left only its being a master, a slave will always be spoken of in relation to that. For a slave is called slave of a master. On the other hand, if that in relation to which a thing is spoken of is not properly given, then, when the other things are stripped off and that alone is left to which it was given as related, it will not be spoken of in relation to that. Suppose a slave is given as of a man and a wing as of a bird, and strip off from man his being a master; a slave will no longer be spoken of in relation to a man, for if there is no master there is no slave either. Similarly, strip off from bird its being winged; a wing will no longer be a relative, for if there is nothing winged neither will there be a wing of anything.
710. One must therefore give as correlative whatever it is properly spoken of in relation to; and if a name already exists it is easy to give this, but if it does not it may be necessary to invent a name. When correlatives are given thus it is clear that all relatives will be spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.
To properly find correlatives one must relate them directly and essentially, not accidentally. "... none reciprocates if a relative is given as related to something accidental and not to just that thing in relation to which it is spoken of." The example used would be trying to relate the relation of slave to man, or slave to biped. Slave should rather be related to master only, as that is the only proper relation that reciprocates when all other aspects are stripped away. If one stripped off man in searching for the common aspect, then the master-slave relation would disappear altogether as the master-slave relation depends on their being a man to adhere in.
Simultaneous Versus Non-Simultaneous Correlatives
7>15. Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature; and in most cases this is true. For there is at the same time a double and a half, and when there is a half there is a double, and when there is a slave there is a master; and similarly with the others. Also, one carries the other to destruction; for if there is. not a double there is not a half, and if there is not a half there is not a double. So too with other such cases. Yet it does not seem to be true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For the knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge. For as a rule it is of actual things already existing that we acquire knowledge; in few cases, if any, could one find knowledge coming into existence at the same time as what is knowable. Moreover, destruction of the knowable carries knowledge to destruction, but knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. For if there is not a knowable there is not knowledge—there will no longer be anything for knowledge to be of—-but if there is not knowledge there is nothing to prevent there being a knowable. Take, for example, the squaring of the circle, supposing it to be knowable; knowledge of it does not yet exist but the knowable itself exists. Again, if animal is destroyed there is no knowledge, but there may be many knowables. The case of perception is similar to this; the perceptible seems to be prior to perception. For the destruction of the perceptible carries perception to destruction, but perception does not carry the perceptible to destruction. For perceptions are to do with body and in body, and if the perceptible is destroyed, body too is destroyed (since body is itself a perceptible), and if there is not body, perception too is destroyed; hence the perceptible carries perception to destruction. But perception does not carry the perceptible. For if animal is destroyed perception is destroyed, but there will be something perceptible, such as body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all the other perceptibles. Moreover, perception comes into existence at the same time as what is capable of perceiving-—-an animal and perception come into existence at the same time-—but the perceptible exists even before perception exists; fire and water and so on, of which an animal is itself made up, exist even before there exists an animal at all, or perception. Hence the perceptible would seem to be prior to perception.
While most relatives are simultaneous by nature, i.e. that as soon as one exists the other must exist. For example, as soon as one has a child one becomes a father or mother. You're not a father and mother unless there was at the same time a child. But this is not always the case. There are some relatives which are not simultaneous because they have to deal with thing A's relation to thing B where thing B precedes thing A in existence. The examples Aristotle gives are knowledge and the knowable and perception and the perceptible. By the knowable and the perceptible he is referring to reality itself and by knowledge and perception he is referring to the individual person who both perceives and learns things. Obviously reality as knowable and as perceptible must preceded the human knower in time and is not dependent on the human knower, while the human knower cannot exist with reality.
8413. It is a problem whether (as one would think) no substance is spoken of as a relative, or whether this is possible with regard to some secondary substances. In the case of primary substances it is true; neither wholes nor parts are spoken of in relation to anything. An individual man is not called someone’s individual man, nor an individual ox someone’s individual ox. Similarly with parts; an individual hand is not called someone’s individual hand (but someone’s hand), and an individual head 1s not called someone’s individual head (but someone’s head). Similarly with secondary substances, at any rate most of them. For example, a man is not called someone’s man nor an ox someone’s ox nor a log someone’s log (but it is called someone’s property). With such cases, then, it is obvious that they are not relatives, but with some secondary substances there is room for dispute. For example, a head is called someone’s head and a hand is called someone’s hand, and so on; so that these would seem to be relatives.
8228. Now if the definition of relatives which was given above was adequate, it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to reach the solution that no substance is spoken of as a relative. But if it was not adequate, and if those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer may be found. The previous definition does, indeed, apply to all relatives, yet this—their being called what they are, of other things—is not what their being relatives is.
This is a very difficult part of the text, but in so many words what I think it is saying is that if a thing can be known on its own without a relation to another, then it is not considered a proper relation, but a substance. And that's why we don't have to include the modifier of relation when we talk about things, because they are what they are regardless of who they are in relation to. He is clear that this is the case with primary substances, but seems unsure about secondary substances.
8435. It is clear from this that if someone knows any relative definitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. This is obvious on the face of it. For if someone knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is a relative, and being for relatives is the same as being somehow related to something, he knows that also to which this is somehow related. For if he does not in the least know that to which this is somehow related, neither will he know whether it is somehow related to something. The same point is clear also in particular cases. For example, if someone knows definitely of a certain ‘this’ that it is double he also, by the same token, knows definitely what it is double of; for if he does not know it to be double anything definite neither does he know whether it is double at all. Similarly, if he knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is more beautiful, he must also, because of this, know definitely what it is more beautiful than. (He is not to. know indefinitely that this is more beautiful than an inferior thing. This is a case of supposition, not knowledge. For he will no longer strictly know that it is more beautiful than an inferior thing, since it may so happen that there is nothing inferior to it.) It is plain, therefore, that anyone who knows any relative definitely must know definitely that also in relation to which it is spoken of.
8°15. But as for a head or a hand or any such substance, it is possible to know it—-what it itself is—definitely, without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, it is not necessary! to know definitely. So these would not be relatives. And if they are not relatives it would be true to say that no substance is a relative.
821. It is perhaps hard to make firm statements on such questions without having examined them many times. Still, to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable.
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