A Second Look at Plato's Euthyphro

Stephen Alexander Beach

Previously, I have written a more brief outline of the dialogue here. 

Introduction

German scholar Paul Friedlander speaks of the Euthyphro as an "aporetic" dialogue; 1 aporetic meaning "characterized by an irresolvable internal contradiction or logical disjunction". 2 Here the aporesis 3 refers to the inherent hurdle in the dialogue over the nature of piety. Is piety something from the gods, or does it transcend the gods? Piety can be either ὅσιον (hosion) or εὐσεβές (eusebes). ὅσιον (hosion) and εὐσεβές (eusebes) being used in the Euthyphro to express a type of public piety which men must provide the gods. "Piety to the Greek did not mean, first and foremost, a private, hidden attitude of mind. It meant the objective conduct of man in relation to the gods, with man understood not as the individual, but as rooted in family and community." 4 Interestingly, εὐσεβές (eusebes) is only used three times in the dialogue. Those are at the very beginning where Socrates is talking about his charge of "impiety" that he received. The rest of the 70 times ὅσιον (hosion) is used. 5 

The Setting of the Dialogue - Outside King-Archon's Court

This dialogue takes place with a chance encounter between Socrates and a professional priest, Euthyphro. "We know nothing about Euthyphro except what we can gather from this dialogue. He is obviously a professional priest who considers himself an expert on ritual and on piety generally, and, it seems, is generally so considered." 6 They run into each other around king-archon's court (one of nine magistrates, the one who dealt with religious matters), and Euthyphro questions why Socrates would not be in his usual place at the Lyceum ("a gymnasium outside the walls of Athens") but rather at a legal building. 7 

Socrates is not there to indict someone like Euthyphro is. Rather, he is being indicted by a man named Meletus on account of corrupting the youth, supposedly. He also has accused Socrates of making up new gods and disbelieving in the old ones, and likewise just spewing his opinions to anyone who will listen. 

Euthyphro's Indictment - Is He Impious for Indicting His Father, or the Most Pius?

Turning to Euthyphro's situation, then, it becomes clear that Euthyphro is the one doing the indicting in his case. He is actually indicting his father for murder, something which shocks Socrates. "Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to do this, but of one who is far advanced in wisdom. ... Is then the man your father killed one of your relatives? Or is that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger." 

But does it matter that his father killed a servant and not a family member for Euthyphro to indict? Euthyphro doesn't think so. It is rather about justice, not relations. "It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares your hearth and table." 

[A few brief connecting thoughts to this came to mind - namely from Oedipus Rex, The Odyssey, and Antigone. Think about Oedipus Rex. Oedipus killed a stranger in road rage, and didn't think much of it. And yet the stranger turned out to be his father, was the cause of plague and suffering for the whole city of Thebes, and his own downfall. Immoral acts, even if done to those we don't care about, have consequences to them. 

In the Odyssey, the suitors are abusive to the beggars, to Odysseus in disguise. Those who are the wise servants, though (and even some fearful suitors) point out that one must treat everyone with respect because they know that they gods can come in any human form they desire to test them. You don't really know who strangers are, so treat every guest as sacred from Zeus. This, again, hinting at a deeper morality than just what might suit an individual and their cares. 

In Antigone, the same theme arises. Polyneices was a traitor ... say why care about his burial or his body being consumed by birds and dogs? For Antigone his sins did not matter. It was more fundamental that he was her brother and that the respect for the god's law of burial should be followed, not the angry laws of king Creon. She, like Euthyphro, is willing to take this moral standard to its conclusion even if it means suffering for her.] 

Apparently, a dependent of Euthyphro, a servant, became drunk and killed another slave. His father then bound the man and threw him into a ditch and left him there in the cold and without food or water, while sending another servant to consult a seer in Athens about what to do with the man. In the meanwhile, the man died. His family does not care, but Euthyphro does. Euthyphro's relatives actually claim impiety against Euthyphro for doing this to his father. 

What is Piety? - A First Attempt With An Example

Euthyphro is confident that he knows what piety is over and above the average person, given that he is a priest and theologian. He is so confident that when Socrates says that he wants to become his student so that he can deflect his lone-actions to the authority of his new teacher, Euthyphro, even if it means having Euthyphro indicted, he actually does not mind this. 

And so Euthyphro gives a first attempt at a definition. He says that piety is just what he is doing by prosecuting his father despite their relations on account of his crime. This is precisely what Zeus did to his father, Cronos. Socrates points out though that this is just an example, what is the universal definition which can encompass all pious and impious acts? 

A Second Attempt - What's the Universal Definition? 

Forced by Socrates, Euthyphro gives a universal definition. He says piety is what is dear to the gods, and the impious what is not dear to the gods. But earlier Socrates got Euthyphro to admit that the gods are often at war with one another. Following that, they must be disagreeing about something of important, for certainly people do not come to war with one another over simple things that can be clearly proven. And so Socrates references the "just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad" as those which cause men to disagree. So too the gods must disagree about what is pious an impious, and the question is not answered as the gods will hold contradictory views of the pious and impious. Just as men disagree about the nature of punishment for the wrong doer, so too the gods may look on actions differently. Would not Cronos despise the action of Zeus? 

A Third Attempt - That Was Just a Quality of Piety 

Euthyphro, in an attempt to bolster his argument, augments it. He says that those actions to which all the gods would agree be pious or impious is the nature of piety or impiety. Socrates presses him further asking if that which is pious is what all the gods agree on, then do they agree because that action is pious in itself or is it pious because they all happen to agree on it? Socrates is trying to find which comes first in priority, the action being loved and thus the god's loving it, or the gods loving it and thus it is being loved. Clearly the latter makes more sense because a subject must act on the object for it to be in a state of being acted upon. 

And so going back to the definition of piety being that which all the gods love, in terms of what is loved, the lover comes first. So does this hold as true for piety? Euthyphro says that all love it because the action is pious. This would mean though that being god-beloved and being pious are not the same thing because being god-beloved must come after the subject loving, while piety was said to precede the subject loving. "...the one is of a nature to be loved [received quality second] because it is loved [by the subject first], the other is loved [subject second] because it is of a nature to be loved [quality first]." 

4th Attempt - A Subset of Justice - Caring for the Gods

Piety, they establish, is a subset of justice, but what subset? Euthyphro says, "...that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice." They clarify that care is meant as the "aim at the good and the benefit of the object cared for." Does this mean that when we do something pious we make the gods better than they were? Euthyphro clarifies that it is rather a type of service, such as slaves to their masters. Slaves, then, serve by intending the good that their master's aim at. What do the god's aim at then in which we assist them? Euthyphro does not answer but rather retreats and just says that pleasing prayers and sacrifices which aid the city are pious. 

5th Attempt - Giving and Receiving to/from the gods. 

So Socrates asks if the knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice are piety. Euthyphro agrees. Sacrifice is giving to the gods while prayer is asking from them. Piety then is the giving and receiving from the gods. We ask for what we need and give to them what they need. "Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men?" 

But what do the gods really need from us? Euthyphro says nothing but they like receiving honor, praise, and gratitude from us. And so we are back at square one as Socrates has Euthyphro admit again that this is equivalent to saying piety is what is dear to the gods. Socrates points out that we have fallen into the same trap and come full circle to the beginning. We are saying that piety is the quality of being loved by the gods which makes no sense to call piety because the gods (subject) must come first to give the quality. Therefore, piety has no grounding in mythology. 

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1 - Friedlander, Paul. Plato: 2 The Dialogues First Period. New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1964. Pg. 82

2 - Oxford dictionary online 

3 - From Chat GPT - The Ancient Greek word ἀπόρησις (aporēsis) derives from the verb ἀπορέω (aporeō), which means “to be at a loss” or “to be perplexed.” ἀπόρησις refers to a state of perplexity, puzzlement, or doubt, typically in the context of philosophical inquiry or debate. It denotes the point in a discussion where one reaches an impasse, unable to find a clear answer or resolution. This term is often used in the context of Socratic dialogue, where questioning leads to a state of uncertainty or confusion, pushing the interlocutor to recognize the limits of their knowledge. The state of ἀπόρησις is sometimes seen as the starting point for deeper philosophical inquiry, as it highlights the need for further questioning and exploration. Sources such as Plato’s dialogues frequently present ἀπόρησις as a critical moment in philosophical discussions. It reflects the process of inquiry that leads to the realization of ignorance, which for Socrates is a key step in the pursuit of wisdom.

4 - Friedlander, Paul. Plato: 2 The Dialogues First Period. New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1964. Pg. 82

5 - In the Euthyphro, eusebes is only used three times while hosios is used 70 times. 

Eusebes 1 - Euthyphro 5c - Socrates: And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both

Eusebes 2 and 3 - 12e - [12e] Socrates: Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy. Euthyphro: This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men. Socrates: I think you are correct, Euthyphro;

6 - Aristotle only uses eusebes three times, and these occur in his work The Rhetoric: 

[29] If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes15 is apposite— that “it is unfair for an impious man to challenge a pious one,” for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. [30] If you accept the oath, you may say that you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should tender the oath and the pious man take it; and that it would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it before giving their verdict. [31] But if you tender the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the matter to the gods; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for you allow him to make the decision himself;

He uses hosion more often. 

Aristotle Politics 1262a

Moreover it is not easy for those who institute this communism to guard against such objectionable occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some cases voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language; all of which are violations of piety when committed against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they were not relatives; but these are bound to occur more frequently when people do not know their relations than when they do, and also, when they do occur, if the offenders know their relationship it is possible for them to have the customary expiations performed, but for those who do not no expiation is possible. Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons common property only debars lovers from intercourse and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiarities, which between father and son or brother and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact of love between them is unseemly. And it is also strange that he deprives them of intercourse for no other reason except because the pleasure is too violent; and that he thinks it makes no difference that the parties are in the one case father or son and in the other case brothers of one another. And it seems that this community of wives and sons is more serviceable for the Farmer class than for the Guardians;

1335B 

As to exposing or [20] rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sensation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive.

It is used once in the Nicomachean ethics in 1096a:

The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation, which we shall consider in the sequel. [8]

The Life of Money-making is a constrained2 kind of life, and clearly wealth is not the Good we are in search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means to something else. On this score indeed one might conceive the ends before mentioned to have a better claim, for they are approved for their own sakes. But even they do not really seem to be the Supreme Good; however, many arguments against them have been disseminated, so we may dismiss them.6.

But perhaps it is desirable that we should examine the notion of a Universal Good, and review the difficulties that it involves, although such an inquiry goes against the grain because of our friendship for the authors of the Theory of Ideas.3 Still perhaps it would appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obligatory, especially for a philosopher, to sacrifice even one's closest personal ties in defense of the truth. Both are dear to us, yet 'tis our duty to prefer the truth.4 [2]

and 6 times in the Athenian Constitution:

6 - Plato. Five Dialogues Euthyphro Apology Crito Meno Phaedo. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981. Pg. 6 footnote

7 - Plato, Euthyphro. Translated by Cathal Woods and Ryan Pack. https://philosophyintrocourse.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/plato-euthyphro.pdf . Footnotes.