Ch. 1 “Words, Concepts, and Signs” from “Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning” by John Oesterle

Stephen Alexander Beach 

(932 Words) 

Two Modes of Knowing 

Oesterle begins chapter one by making a basic distinction in philosophy, that of the knowledge of the senses and that of the mind. The distinction, in so many words, is that the senses know that which is material and individual, while the mind knows the natures of things which are universal and stripped of physicality and singularity. “By our senses we know the colors and sounds and the sizes and shapes of things … We do not senes the natures of things; we sense only the material, singular characteristics of things. … We recognize also from experience that our intellectual knowledge is abstractive. We abstract when we make a separation. Intellectual abstraction, or separation, consists in leaving aside whatever is material and singular, retaining only the nature of the thing, as we abstract man from James. … our intellect directs us to the natures of these things, which, by abstraction, are known as universals. Through concepts we know directly the universal nature of material, singular things.” 1 These universal notions which the mind abstracts are known as concepts. 

Concepts vs. Words

Concepts differ from words in that words are physical expressions given to the abstract concepts. And so it is through words that concepts are communicated. They are the medium and the tool by which humans communicate with one another. And so words are going to play an important role in logic as well. Now, words and language are complex, for sure, but always inadequate in fully expressing the ideas in the mind. 2 “There is, therefore, necessarily some gap between a material means of signifying, as with words, and an immaterial means of signifying, as with concepts. Because of this incommensurability between words and concepts, words cannot adequately or perfectly signify concept. Words, in fact, arbitrarily signify concepts.” This is seen, of course, in that different languages have different words for the same universal concepts of experience. 

Charles Sanders Peirce - Founder of Modern Study of Semiotics

Three Elements of Signification

Now that we know the difference between words and concepts, Oesterle brings us to the idea that both words and concepts are themselves signs. “A sign is that which represents something other than itself to a knowing power.” And so it is helpful to distinguish between reality, the knower (using sense and intellect), and that which is known through signification, i.e. the sign itself, such as the concept and words. “The definition also reveals the elements of signification: the sign (that which represents), the thing signified (something other than itself), and the knowing power.” 3 

And so a sign exists between two realities, the knower and the known. 

James seeing and thinking —————— words and concepts (the signs) ————— ontological reality. 

Types of Signs

Oesterle lists five kinds of signs in this chapter, the formal sign, instrumental sign, natural sign, conventional sign, and customary sign. 

Formal Sign - These refer to the two mediums through which we know by the senses and intellect. The medium for the senses is the “image” he says [though I think this must be used in a broader sense to include sound and the others forms of sense. I think the word phantasm is more appropriate.] and the medium for the intellect is the concept. 

Instrumental Sign - This refers to human made artifacts which are used as signs, and therefore are considered instruments of something else. He uses the example of a traffic light being an instrumental sign for stopping one’s car. 4 “All words are instrumental signs, for we must first know the word before we know the meaning of the word. All concepts are formal signs, leading us directly to the knowledge of things themselves. By understanding concepts as formal signs, we see that concepts are never the objects of our intellectual knowing, except indirectly, but only the means by which we know things.” Now this is a hugely important point that Oesterle makes here, namely, that concepts are not things themselves but rather a representation of a thing that allows us to have some knowledge of the thing itself. Hence, our concepts are always limited in relation to the mystery of the real thing. And so there is reality itself, the modes through which we know it (the phantasm and the concept), and then the instrumental signs we use to manipulate those formal signs (words and artificial things). 

Natural Sign - This refers to things in nature that signify other things in nature. The example Oesterle gives is that of smoke and fire. If one sees smoke, it means that there is also fire. It is a causal relationship and therefore universally in the minds of men the two become linked in a signification type of way. Mental concepts are natural signs because when someone experiences them they come away with the same natural idea. And so formal signs and natural signs go together. 

Conventional Sign - These are the signs that men make up and must agree upon for universal usage, such as was mentioned with words and symbols. Instrumental signs and conventional signs go together. 5

“Word —— (signifies by convention)—-> Concept ——(signifies naturally) ——> Thing” 

Customary Sign - This is a type of blending between the natural and conventional signs. It is partly rooted in natural experience, but also is a custom that is developed from tradition or custom. This could be something like bowing as a sign of respect, for example. 

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1 - Oesterle, John. Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1955. Pg. 3

2 - 4

3 - 5

4 - 6

5 - 7