Can I Buy Items Generated by Slave Labor? - Distinctions In The Types of Cooperation in Evil - Article by William Newton in Homiletic and Pastoral Review

Stephen Alexander Beach 

(1980 Words)

The question of moral cooperation in evil is as complicated a question in today's world as the confusing economic web that binds the global world together. And so, for those who wish to live by a moral conscience, it is essential to have some theological tools to discern when and where we might be participating in the evil of other people. For example, everyone uses rechargeable batteries in their phones, computers, and electric cars (for those that have them), but these batteries are made with the rare earth mineral Cobalt, of which 70% is only found in a small region of the Congo. Within the last few years, it has been exposed that these Cobalt mines run off the backs of slave labor (See Siddhartha Kara's book "Cobalt Red"). Is the consumer somehow responsible for this slave labor when they buy their new iPhone? That is a difficult question, but a valuable one to ask. 

Cooperation, here, is different from the encouragement of someone to do evil, and also different from when someone participates in the same action as the evil doer with them. Cooperation is a certain type of help in committing the action, while not being a part of the full action itself. This article from Homiletic and Pastoral Review by Dr. William Newton does a great job at offering theological distinctions which can help clarify what it means to participate in someone else's evil. "Avoiding Cooperation with Evil: Keeping Your Nose Clean in a Dirty World". Now, while the article does not fully give answers to all of the examples that are brought up, it does offer some helpful principles. 

(All that being said, I am recounting the main points from this article to the best of my understanding. I am not a moral theologian on this level, and so I could have made some errors here or there. I recommend reading the article directly, linked above, as well.)

Formal Cooperation in Evil 

The first, and most basic, distinction with regard to this question is that of distinguishing between "formal" and "material" cooperation in evil. Formal cooperation consists in giving help in an evil action, while at the same time also willing that evil action alongside the person. Even if the person does not come out and verbally say that they agree with the evil action, an implicit or interior agreement is sufficient to be considered a formal cooperation in evil. The example used in the article is a man who not only drives a woman to an abortion clinic, but wants her to have the abortion as well, rather than, say, driving her as an opportunity to talk her out of it (which is probably also still wrong to contribute that directly to her arriving there). 

"In regard to formal cooperation, it is enough for the cooperator to reluctantly will what the evil-doer wills. There is no need for enthusiasm.  Imagine the situation in a country where, by law, health care providers, if they are to operate at all, must provide a statutory range of services including abortion.  What can St. Raphael’s Catholic Hospital do?  It could, perhaps, join forces with Rosemount Hospital, which does abortions. However, Rosemount has no maternity unit, which is also a mandatory service.  Together, the hospitals form one legal entity, fulfilling the requirements.  

While none of St. Raphael’s staff are involved in abortions, nor its facilities used for that purpose, there is a problem with this.  The Catholic hospital cooperates with Rosemount in the sense of facilitating its existence as a legal health service provider, a provider which does abortions.  Moreover, St. Raphael’s administration must implicitly will—even if only reluctantly—that Rosemount provide these illicit services, since, without this, St. Raphael’s cannot function as a hospital. 3 This is formal cooperation."

Material Cooperation in Evil 

For the person who has an upright conscience, given they do not will any evil act, they may not be in danger of formal cooperation in evil, and yet still may find themselves somehow supporting or enabling evil in a material sense to happen because of their actions. The example used is of a morally righteous man, James, working in a book store, and being required to stock shelves with pornography. James does not agree with this, and does not want to support pornography at all, but this happens to be one of his job requirements, and so the physical act of stocking shelves contributes to its sale in some way. This would be considered material cooperation. 

A Sufficient Reason for Material Cooperation?

This brings up a fundamental consideration that the author of the article points out ... when it comes to material cooperation, is there a "sufficiently good" reason for James to be a material cooperator? This can be determined by looking at two further factors, that of whether the help is "immediate" or "mediate", and whether, if it is mediate, that help is "proximate" or "remote". 

Fundamentally, though, in determining how close of a cooperation the person has in the act (an evil tolerated) must also be balanced with the good which the person does intend by intersecting with that evil act. For example, is the evil tolerated of stocking the pornography in the bookstore greater than the good intended of having a job, being paid, and paying off his student loans? It would seem not to be, given that there are other job opportunities out there. "To summarize: the point of these examples is to show that there must be a proportion between the good pursued, and the evil tolerated. As the evil worsens, a proportionally greater good is needed to justify cooperation."

Material Cooperation that is Immediate and Mediate

When thinking about material cooperation, it is necessary to consider how close one's actions are to the completion of the evil done. If something is an immediate material cooperation, it means that, while you may not will what is done, you are directly contributing to the completion of that act. The example used is a nurse who hands the doctor surgical instruments for sterilization surgeries. 

If an act is only mediate material cooperation, that means that the action, while contributing in an accidental way, does not contribute in an essential way to the completion of the evil deed, such as a janitor who washes the surgical rooms after operations. "Proximity can make a difference because, the closer the action of the cooperator is to the action of the evil-doer, the more the cooperator shares in the action of the evil-doer.  Consider the situation of Anna, a nurse, and Jessica, a cleaner, who both work at Rosemount Hospital. Both help, in different ways, in facilitating sterilizations. Anna passes instruments to the doctor, while Jessica cleans up after procedures in the operating theater.  Let us suppose neither Anna nor Jessica agrees with the sterilizations."

Material Cooperation that is "Mediate and Proximate" and "Mediate and Remote"

There are yet more layers of connection and separation to an action that can be discussed. When someone does not will an evil act (material cooperation) and is not directly, but indirectly contributing to it (mediate cooperation), there can still be, what is called, a "proximity" or "remoteness" to their cooperation. 

The janitor who cleans the surgical rooms has a more proximate (or close) connection to the sterilizations done, than say, the IT worker who helps keep the computer systems running, an act that is very remote (far away) from the act of sterilization. 

So What About Guilt?

The author of the article unfortunately does not address the guilt regarding all of the specific situations he brings up. But he does makes clear that formal cooperation in the evil act of another is always sinful. The author also makes the argument that material cooperation that is immediate (directly necessary for the action to happen) is also always sinful. In so many words, our actions speak louder than our words, and so even if we protest that we don't agree with something, and yet still contribute essentially to it, we are guilty. 

"It should be clear by now that the question of material cooperation is a particular application of the theory of double effect.  In aiming at some goal that is, in itself, good, someone might accept, but not intend, a bad side effect—namely assisting the evil-doer—when there is a proportionate reason to do so; that is, there is a reasonable proportion between the good sought, and the evil tolerated."

Not Sinning is Still Not Virtue

The author also takes time at the end of the article to make the point that, just because a type of cooperation in evil may not be sinful for us, ... that does not mean that it is virtuous, or that it won't have effects on us in a negative way. We may become desensitized to the evil that is taking place, we may cause scandal for those who know us as a righteous person, we forfeit our responsibility to witness to the truth to the person directly doing the evil, and it can also contribute to the decay of society, as more evil actions are continuing in the world and destroying the human community. We should be striving to rid the world of evil, not to justify allowing its continued existence. 

The author also takes a bit of time to address the question of benefitting off the evil of others, even if we do not cooperate in the action that produced it. For example, back to the beginning of this post about Cobalt and cell phones. I was not part of the evil that produced the cell phone, they are already in the store before I buy one of them. But, in buying the item I am in some way supporting that whole economic structure which utilizes slavery. "This is similar, in some sense, to consumers who knowingly purchase products made in third world sweat shops, motivated by the cheap price of the products.  In voluntarily benefiting from this situation, such customers cooperate with the companies that run these shops by supporting these structures of exploitation." While the author does not spell out the morality of this situation in more detail, it seems clear that from the principles laid out in the article that one should ask the question: "Is there a proportionate grave moral good that I need to pursue in order to justify a remote cooperation in that industry?"

The Author's Conclusion

Dr. Newton sums up the main point of the article in his conclusion, and so I will quote it here: 

"Formal cooperation with evil is always wrong, since it involves willing what is evil, and helping to bring this about.  In contrast, material cooperation with evil is not always wrong.  It can sometimes be justified, when it is done in the pursuit of goals that are sufficiently good to warrant tolerating the unintended evil of the evil-doer.

Let us remember that God himself cooperates with evil in the sense that he keeps us, and our actions, in existence even when we do evil!  This is material cooperation since God does not will the evil we do, but rather the good of our existence and freedom.  For the sake of that, he justifiably cooperates in our sinful actions.  Moreover, as Fisher notes, Jesus himself told his followers to pay taxes, some of which, no doubt, would be used for some evil projects, just like today! 17

Nonetheless, even material cooperation with evil should never be taken lightly.  By causing scandal, we can fail in our love for others, leading them into sin. While wrongfully cooperating with evil, corrupts our own moral sensitivity, making us participators in the evil action of the evil-doer, thereby deforming our own moral character.  This is a failure to love ourselves.  Ultimately, wrongful cooperation with evil is a failure to love God, above all things. It represents a disordered desire for lower goods, since in seeking them, we are willing to turn away from the supreme good, God himself."

My own opinion about how to apply these moral principles to the question of buying a phone with a rechargeable battery is that as a consumer in America we are accidentally participating in the action of enslavement, and so if we have a serious reason, like needing to participate in society and feed our family with a job, then it is justified. That does not necessarily mean it's moral to buy new tech just for the sake of it. It also doesn't mean that its virtuous, just that we are not sinning. The more virtuous act would be to abstain altogether and help fight this issue. 

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1 - Newton, William. "Avoiding Cooperation with Evil: Keeping Your Nose Clean in a Dirty World." In Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Sep. 21, 2012.