Does Happiness Consist in Pleasure? From the Summa Theologiae I-II, Q2, A6 by Thomas Aquinas

Stephen Alexander Beach 
(926 Words) 

This is part of a series of posts on happiness from Thomas Aquinas. Here are the other posts dealing with money, power, and honor. One thing to note here is that Thomas is not saying that money, power, pleasure, and honor are evil in themselves, or have no goodness to offer, but rather that they are not the chief and ultimate good which is willed for its own sake and not for the sake of anything beyond it. It is simply sufficient for him to show that we will these goods for the sake of others goods to demonstrate that perfect happiness does not consist in these things. 

The same is true of pleasure, whether it's bodily pleasure or spiritual delight/happiness. Aquinas holds that the experience of delight is a secondary result of the obtaining of a good. Thus, one cannot pursue delight as such, but only goods which bring delight. And so the delight will correspond to the good obtained. And thus Aquinas says that it is the final end of happiness, but not the formal cause of happiness, that is the good thing itself. 

The Arguments In Favor of Pleasure as the Chief Good

The first argument presented in favor of pleasure as the chief good is that the desire to feel good is self -evident. You don't have to ask someone why they want to eat a slice of pizza if they are hungry, it is self evident that it will make them feel good. The chief good is supposed to be that which is willed for its own sake and not the sake of another thing, and therefore the argument goes that this must be pleasure as, again, we do not question why someone would want to feel good. 

Second, the argument is made that since pleasure seems to be what motivates all men to choose what they do, therefore it must be the chief good. This is because it is the first cause which most deeply penetrates man's will as it is the ultimate source of everything else good, and if pleasure seems to motivate people most of all then it must be that which penetrates man's will most deeply. 

Third, if all men desire what is good, they will logically also desire what is best. The argument is made that what is best must be that which all people desire, and as has been already said, all people seem to be motivated by feeling good. Therefore, what is best is pleasure. 

Responses to the Arguments 

In response to the first argument is that even though the desire for pleasure is self-evident, that doesn't make it the final end of man. In fact, pleasure, as such, does not exist, but is rather an effect of the obtaining and resting in some good. And therefore pleasure cannot be a thing in itself that is pursued, but always a concomitant fellow with good things. Therefore, we can say that the ultimate good will bring with it the ultimate pleasure, but not that we can pursue pleasure itself, nor that lower goods which bring pleasure will be sought solely for their own sake, seeing as they are always incomplete, temporary, and fleeting. 

In response to the second argument Aquinas points out that due to our state as being incarnate in bodies, it is the bodily functions and knowledge which closest and most obvious to us. Therefore, it makes sense that most people seek bodily pleasure above other things, as it is the most apparent good to human nature. This does not necessarily make it the best good, though. 

Third, Aquinas points out that delight is not a thing in itself, but correspondent to goods which do exist. "All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good." 

St. Thomas' Thoughts 

To answer this question about pleasure St. Thomas refers to the distinctions between essential and accidental being. Essential being that which is part of the common universal characteristics of a thing or action, and which cannot be that type of thing without them. A man cannot be a man without having a head, for example. Accidental being that which exists in a thing or action, but non-essentially. It could have or not have that characteristic and still be the same type of thing, such as a man having white or black skin. In this case, Thomas is referring to bodily pleasure as an accident of the happiness which is obtained with the goodness of a thing. For example, to obtain the chief good would result in a chief happiness. 

But this cannot be bodily pleasures because the senses are lesser faculties in man than his rational soul, and therefore a moment of sensory pleasure pales in comparison to the fulfillment of the highest parts of man in his intellect and will. "Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul." 

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1 - Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. First Part of the Second Part, Q2, A6 https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/summa/FS/FS002.html#FSQ2OUTP1